An Expense out of Control: Rule 33 Interrogatories After the Advent of Initial Disclosures and Two Proposals for Change by Luria, Amy & Clabby, John E.
Chapman Law Review
Volume 9 | Issue 1 Article 2
2005
An Expense out of Control: Rule 33 Interrogatories




Follow this and additional works at: http://digitalcommons.chapman.edu/chapman-law-review
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Fowler School of Law at Chapman University Digital Commons. It has been accepted for
inclusion in Chapman Law Review by an authorized administrator of Chapman University Digital Commons. For more information, please contact
laughtin@chapman.edu.
Recommended Citation
Amy Luria & John E. Clabby, An Expense out of Control: Rule 33 Interrogatories After the Advent of Initial Disclosures and Two Proposals
for Change, 9 Chap. L. Rev. 29 (2005).
Available at: http://digitalcommons.chapman.edu/chapman-law-review/vol9/iss1/2




An Expense out of Control:                                    
Rule 33 Interrogatories After the Advent of 
Initial Disclosures and Two Proposals for 
Change 
Amy Luria & John E. Clabby 
Interrogatories exchanged under Federal Rule of Civil 
Procedure 33 drain litigation resources while providing few 
concomitant benefits to litigants.  Despite this problem, there is no 
recent scholarly literature suggesting reform to this device.  Other 
discovery devices, including initial disclosures and requests for 
admission, better serve parties as relatively fast and cheap 
exchanges of information in advance of trial.  This Essay 
describes the wastes and benefits of Rule 33 interrogatories as 
parties use them in practice today.  Then, this Essay makes and 
evaluates two proposals for change.  In the first proposal, the 
Essay suggests creating mandatory, uniform interrogatories keyed 
to substantive areas of law, following a model that several states 
have already incorporated into their civil rules.  In the second and 
alternative proposal, this Essay proposes eliminating Rule 33 
interrogatories altogether, because most of the work that the 
Advisory Committee on Civil Rules first intended interrogatories 
to do is now better accomplished through other discovery devices. 
I. INTRODUCTION 
In practice, Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 33 
interrogatories exchange little substantive information between 
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parties.  Sending interrogatories costs a litigant more than that 
party earns in information.  Often, filing interrogatories 
generates nothing but unresponsive, by-the-book objections or 
otherwise evasive answers from an opponent.1  The norms of 
practice encourage a lawyer to file interrogatories, even though 
the answers to those interrogatories would not help that lawyer’s 
client.2 
Interrogatories are the most abused discovery vehicle, and 
what is more problematic is that their cost generates little value.3  
Attorneys ask questions drawn from a stock reserve and those 
questions return only objections, vague answers, and very little 
information.4  This is due in part to the ease with which one can 
generate interrogatories, as well as “the proliferation of machine-
stored questions.”5  As a result, interrogatories are often 
“frustrating, costly, and ineffective for both parties.”6  The 
standard objections of “overly broad,” “vague,” and “unduly 
burdensome” provide no substantive content to the sender of the 
interrogatories.7  Compounding the problem, adversaries and the 
courts are normally reluctant to condemn the liberal objector.8  
Courts want to stay out of discovery disputes except in the worst 
cases, and adversaries themselves are playing similar games 
with their own objections. 
 
 1 See ROGER S. HAYDOCK ET AL., FUNDAMENTALS OF PRETRIAL LITIGATION 364-65 
(4th ed. 2000) (discussing the “limitations, weaknesses, and risks” of using interrogatories 
and warning against attorneys who abuse the system). 
 2 See THOMAS E. WILLGING ET AL., FED. JUDICIAL CTR., DISCOVERY AND DISCLOSURE 
PRACTICE, PROBLEMS, AND PROPOSALS FOR CHANGE: A CASE-BASED NATIONAL SURVEY OF 
COUNSEL IN CLOSED FEDERAL CIVIL CASES 13 tbl.2 (1997) (reporting one survey of 
attorneys in federal court showing that in cases involving some discovery, 81% of 
attorneys used interrogatories). 
 3 C. Lynn Oliver, Note, Economical Litigation: Kentucky’s Answer to High Costs and 
Delay in Civil Litigation, 71 KY. L.J. 647, 659 (1983) (citing Weyman I. Lundquist, In 
Search of Discovery Reform, 66 A.B.A. J. 1071, 1072 (1980)). 
 4 See FRANCIS H. HARE, JR. ET AL., FULL DISCLOSURE: COMBATING STONEWALLING 
AND OTHER DISCOVERY ABUSES 83-88 (2d prtg. 1995) (describing common tactics for 
evading disclosure under interrogatories, and under other discovery requests, such as 
boilerplate objections, use of semantics, unilaterally limiting the scope of relevance, and 
misleading responses). 
 5 Oliver, supra note 3, at 659. 
 6 U.S. Army Legal Servs., USALSA Report: Litigation Division Note, 1997 ARMY 
LAW. 38, 38 (Aug. 1997). 
 7 HARE, supra note 4, at 83-84. 
 8 Haydock and his co-authors discuss the “Nightmare” test as a guide for when to 
know, as a lawyer, if your response to an interrogatory fails Rule 33’s reasonableness 
standard.  HAYDOCK ET AL., supra note 1, at 394 (“Pretend that the opposing attorney has 
brought a Rule 37 motion before a judge whom you have recently skunked in racquetball 
and that the judge asks you, ‘How in the discovery world can you justify your response?’  
If you defend with a winning retort, your interrogatory response is reasonable.  If you 
wake up in a sweat, you need to redraft your response.”). 
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Put broadly, the problem with interrogatories is that lawyers 
believe, and the system reinforces, that the exchange and answer 
of interrogatories is a game.9  That a lawyer expects an objection 
causes the sender to wrangle over the form of a question and to 
hesitate over the proper term with which to define a thought.10  
Historically, “practitioners have used interrogatories as a 
litigation tactic to harass and to overwhelm an opponent or to 
delay the resolution of a dispute.”11  In return, an entire body of 
literature explains how to avoid giving thorough and responsive 
answers to interrogatories.12 
At base, the problem with interrogatories is lawyer conduct.  
Lawyers must somehow be held accountable for their zealous but 
inefficient use of the device.  Burdensome, overreaching, and 
frivolous questions — and boilerplate, bad-faith objections in 
return — cause delay instead of enlightenment.  Any 
consideration of how to reform the interrogatory device must 
acknowledge the lack of incentives for lawyers to exchange and to 
request information from one another in good faith. 
While some critics suggest that only severe sanctions for this 
stonewalling can prevent such discovery evasion,13 the structure 
of the rules and cooperative norms also play important roles.  
Reforming the structure of the interrogatory device, or isolating 
what is good about the device and transferring that to other 
devices more easily monitored, might structurally solve a 
problem without harsher sanctions or greater judicial 
involvement.  Any change must attempt to decrease the role of 
 
 9 When one party has deviated from fair play into the strategic world of objections, 
tit-for-tat will govern.  HAYDOCK ET AL., supra note 1, at 387 (“Strategically speaking, 
objections to borderline interrogatories may also cause the other side to object to 
borderline interrogatories you submit to them.”). 
 10 Ronald J. Schutz & Darren B. Schwiebert, Interrogatories, in PATENT LITIGATION 
STRATEGIES HANDBOOK 135, 139 (Barry L. Grossman & Gary M. Hoffman eds., 2000) 
(advising a patent litigant that “the specific wording of a well-drafted interrogatory 
should be strategically calculated to elicit the information useful to your position”). 
 11 U.S. Army Legal Servs., supra note 6, at 38. 
 12 E.g., LAWRENCE A. MORSE, OBJECTIONS TO INTERROGATORIES § 1250 (Joan Manno 
ed., 1990) (explaining several different types of objections that one can use in “avoiding or 
limiting” responses to interrogatories); see also United States Army Legal Services, supra 
note 6, at 40 (“The simple goal of Rule 33 is to ensure that a party answers the relevant 
questions of an opposing party.  That is not to say that a party must divulge all 
information in his possession to the opposing party.  Answers to interrogatories should be 
responsive, accurate, and complete, but they should be made with the understanding that 
they will be used against the responding party.  Consequently, interrogatories should be 
approached with a defensive frame of mind.  Words should be chosen carefully, with an 
eye toward their use at trial.”). 
 13 HARE ET AL., supra note 4, at 79 (arguing for “severe sanctions” to deter 
stonewalling in interrogatories and in other discovery devices, a problem that is now in 
“epidemic proportions” due to the economic incentives of corporate parties to a litigation). 
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gamesmanship and to increase the profitable exchange of pretrial 
information between the parties to a lawsuit.  Any change should 
also seek to minimize judicial involvement and help to limit the 
cost to the litigants of pretrial exchanges of questions while 
maximizing their value.  With these ends in mind, any 
amendment to Rule 33 should weigh the benefits of retaining the 
interrogatory device against its expense and efficiency in fairly 
exposing valuable information between adversaries. 
Scholars have failed to address the root cause of the 
inefficiency of interrogatories.  Practitioners have written 
volumes on how to “game” the interrogatory system.  And many 
states have started to amend their rules of civil procedure to 
address this gaming, including experimenting with ideas such as 
uniform interrogatories.  Yet, despite the prominence of the 
problem, scholars have failed to suggest reforming this device. 
This Essay seeks to explore the problem, and makes two 
proposals for change.  Part I explores what is useful about 
interrogatories, both as the device is conceived in theory and as 
the device is used in practice (where the benefits are much 
narrower) and should therefore be preserved.  Specifically, one 
finds that interrogatories are useful in three areas: discovery of 
contentions, discovery of technical or statistical data, and 
discovery of knowledgeable persons.  Such findings are important 
in evaluating the two proposals for change that follow, as we are 
then aware of what may be lost through amendment or 
elimination of Rule 33 interrogatories.  The findings of Part I also 
allow us to evaluate how successful other discovery devices will 
be at replacing the work that interrogatories are intended to 
accomplish. 
In Part II of the Essay, we describe and evaluate two 
proposals for change to the interrogatory device that we believe 
will decrease the role of gamesmanship and increase the 
profitable exchange of pretrial information between the parties to 
a lawsuit.  The first proposal seeks a rehabilitation of Rule 33 to 
preserve what was intended as a meaningful pretrial exchange of 
information between parties.  Proposal I suggests limiting 
interrogatories to certain standardized interrogatories, perhaps 
organized by substantive areas of the law, to which parties would 
be unable to object on grounds other than those of privilege.  
These form interrogatories would include contention 
interrogatories, technical or statistical data interrogatories, and 
knowledgeable person interrogatories.  Failure to answer these 
interrogatories would result in sanctions.  In forming and 
evaluating this proposal, we rely on the rules of civil procedure of 
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a few states that have mandatory interrogatories, uniform 
interrogatories, and both. 
The second proposal is more dramatic: the elimination of 
Rule 33 interrogatories altogether.  The current Federal Rules, 
which already require certain initial disclosures under Rule 
26(a), might benefit from the elimination of the Rule 33 device 
and a concomitant editing of other rules – pertaining to requests 
for admissions, initial disclosures, and pretrial discovery 
conferencing – to retain much of the best features of 
interrogatories.  In analyzing this proposal, we discuss how other 
discovery devices, mainly initial disclosures under Rule 26 and 
requests for admission under Rule 36, are being used by parties 
today to perform the issue-narrowing functions that 
interrogatories were intended to perform. 
Finally, we conclude with a summary of our findings and a 
suggestion to the Advisory Committee on Civil Rules 
(Committee) for how it might combine the two proposals.  The 
federal discovery rules, including Rule 33, were intended to aid in 
the “just, speedy, and inexpensive determination of every 
action,”14 and the reformation or elimination of Rule 33 
interrogatories might rehabilitate what is good about the 
historically “most abused discovery mechanism.”15 
II. FOR WHAT PURPOSES ARE INTERROGATORIES USEFUL? 
Interrogatories are supposed to be cheap, fast, and binding 
on a party.  “In theory, there could not be a simpler, more 
efficient, and less expensive discovery method than sending 
written questions to the opposing party and having him send 
back the sworn written answers.”16  Therefore, the current form 
of interrogatories helps lawyers when used efficiently.17  
However, when attorneys spin their wheels to draft 
unobjectionable questions, and their adversary attorneys retort 
by spinning their wheels to craft objections, seldom does 
information change hands.  Any cost, then, to a useless device is 
too high a cost. 
 
 14 FED. R. CIV. P. 1 official cmt; see Meade W. Mitchell, Comment, Discovery Abuse 
and a Proposed Reform: Mandatory Disclosure, 62 MISS. L.J. 743, 764 (1993).  “The 
speedy and inexpensive resolution of civil procedures was recognized as the most 
important mandate of the rules, embodying the very ‘spirit of the rules.’”  Mitchell, supra, 
at 744 n.7. 
 15 Oliver, supra note 3, at 659 (citing Lundquist, supra note 3, at 1072). 
 16 United States Army Legal Servs., supra note 6, at 38. 
 17 See generally HAYDOCK ET AL., supra note 1, at 364 (listing the advantages of 
interrogatories over other forms of discovery). 
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But interrogatories, in theory, should lead to the inexpensive 
exchange of information between the parties.  An exchange of 
information early in litigation should lead to a faster resolution 
of the dispute and might even encourage settlement.18  
Substantive answers to interrogatories should also lead to more 
targeted discovery requests, which in turn might lead to a faster 
resolution of the dispute.  If the device worked more efficiently, 
then it should help decrease the cost of litigation and increase its 
speed. 
The question then becomes what about interrogatories is 
useful and should therefore be preserved.  Interrogatories serve a 
useful function in three areas: “discovery of contentions, 
discovery of technical or statistical data, and discovery of 
knowledgeable persons.”19  At base, interrogatories are useful for 
the discovery of contentions and the discovery of certain fact lists.  
For these areas, “there probably is no better way to get 
information.”20 
Contention interrogatories are inquiries that require the 
identification of positions on issues in the case.21  Contention 
interrogatories “seek to clarify the basis for or scope of an 
adversary’s legal claims.  The general view is that contention 
interrogatories are a perfectly permissible form of discovery, to 
which a response ordinarily would be required.”22  An example of 
a contention interrogatory is: “Do you contend that plaintiff was 
contributorily negligent regarding the accident on August 6, 
1998?”23 
The contention interrogatory is valuable for a few reasons.  
First, it forces the adversary to reveal her basis for positions 
 
 18 HAYDOCK ET AL., supra note 1, at 364 (The interrogatory device “reveals 
information that will put the parties in realistic and informed positions from which to 
negotiate a settlement or stipulate to agreed facts.”). 
 19 Kenneth R. Berman, Q: Is This Any Way to Write an Interrogatory?  A: You Bet It 
Is, in THE LITIGATION MANUAL PRETRIAL 154, 155 (John G. Koeltl & John Kiernan eds., 
3rd ed. 1999) (discussing when interrogatories serve a useful and sometimes critical 
function).  This paper relies on Berman’s framework for when interrogatories are useful. 
 20 Id. at 155. 
 21 Rule 33(c) specifically allows these types of interrogatories: “An interrogatory 
otherwise proper is not necessarily objectionable merely because an answer to the 
interrogatory involves an opinion or contention that relates to fact or the application of 
law to fact . . . .”  FED. R. CIV. P. 33(c).   
 22 Starcher v. Corr. Med. Sys., 144 F.3d 418, 421 n.2 (6th Cir. 1998); see, e.g., Taylor 
v. Fed. Deposit Ins. Corp., 132 F.3d 753, 762 (D.C. Cir. 1997) (explaining that when a 
complaint is vague and conclusory, a defendant should not move for dismissal, but rather 
should serve contention interrogatories); Vidimos, Inc. v. Laser Lab Ltd., 99 F.3d 217, 222 
(7th Cir. 1996) (explaining that if a defendant wishes to minimize uncertainty concerning 
the scope of a plaintiff’s claim, the defendant could serve contention interrogatories). 
 23 HAYDOCK ET AL., supra note 1, at 370. 
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taken in the pleadings.24  Second, it is generally immune from 
evasion because the responding party cannot claim ignorance of 
the answer when the question is based on the responding party’s 
claims.25  In fact, if in a negligence case, one’s adversary 
responds, “I do not know at this time,” she is “invit[ing] a motion 
for summary judgment or a motion to strike under Rule 11.”26  
Third, contention interrogatories are often “invaluable in 
narrowing the issues, laying foundations for motions, and 
preparing a thorough trial defense.”27 
In addition, interrogatories target technical and statistical 
data better than do other forms of discovery, in part because 
depositions and document requests cannot readily expose this 
information.28  Technical and statistical interrogatories force 
opposing counsel to ask the client to prepare the answer, as it is 
unlikely that the attorney will have all of the necessary 
information at his or her fingertips.29  Moreover, the only evasion 
of such an interrogatory appears to be limited to Rule 33(d), 
which allows one to avoid answering when the answer may be 
derived from reviewing business records, and when the burden of 
deriving such information is the same for both the questioner and 
the answerer.30 
The final area in which interrogatories are useful is in the 
discovery of knowledgeable persons.31  An example of such an 
interrogatory reads: “Please state the name and address of each 
 
 24 See Berman, supra note 19, at 156 (explaining why contention interrogatories are 
valuable); HAYDOCK ET AL., supra note 1, at 367 (explaining that interrogatories are 
useful for explaining pleading allegations in specific detail). 
 25 Berman, supra note 19, at 156. 
 26 Berman, supra note 19, at 156 (citing FED. R. CIV. P. 11 Advisory Committee Note 
to 1993 Amendment). 
 27 U.S. Army Legal Servs., supra note 6, at 39. 
 28 See Berman, supra note 19, at 160 (explaining why interrogatories seeking 
technical or statistical data are useful); see also HAYDOCK ET AL., supra note 1, at 368 
(finding that interrogatories may pursue “[s]ummary explanations of technical data and 
statistics, manuals, reports, studies, and materials containing technical information”). 
 29 Berman, supra note 19, at 161. 
 30 Berman, supra note 19, at 161 (“The answerer is more familiar with the 
documents that contain the information; she will know the meaning of special codes or 
abbreviations in the documents; and she will know how to use the documents to obtain 
the answer.”). 
 31 It is important to note that asking about “knowledgeable persons” through 
interrogatories is still helpful even after the 1993 amendments to the Federal Rules of 
Civil Procedure added initial disclosures.  Although under Federal Rule 26(a)(1)(A), “a 
party must automatically disclose the identity of persons likely to have information 
relevant to disputed facts alleged with particularity in the pleadings,” the term “alleged 
with particularity” is not always clear, and as such, an adversary who concludes that the 
complaint alleges facts without particularity may not disclose the names of important 
witnesses in a Rule 26(a)(1)(A) initial disclosure.  Berman, supra note 19, at 162-63 (citing 
FED. R. CIV. P. 26(a)(1)(A) Advisory Committee Note to the 1993 Amendment). 
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person who has knowledge of a particular subject matter.”  One 
would think that the following two objections to such an 
interrogatory would be quite common: (1) the interrogatory is 
overbroad; and (2) the attorney cannot speculate as to the 
knowledge.  However, Rule 26 appears to preclude the latter 
objection because it assumes that a party answering will in good 
faith disclose the persons the respondent knows or ought to know 
has facts relevant to the particular subject matter.32  However, it 
appears likely that there will always be an “overbroad” objection. 
Despite the possible “overbroad” objection to the 
interrogatory, this particular type of interrogatory adds value to 
the propounding party’s case when it is answered.  First, “the 
answer will be the next best thing to the adversary’s witness 
list.”33  Second, “the answer will guide [one] in framing a 
deposition program” in that it may help narrow “the cast of 
characters.”34  Lastly, the answers to these interrogatories “will 
make document production more meaningful” in that the 
answers will help an attorney request documents by reference to 
named individuals, as well as alert him or her to names to search 
for in the produced documents.35 
Essentially, interrogatories work when lawyers ask for 
specific lists, such as everyone in a company who has information 
about X.36  What this all means is that contention interrogatories 
and those interrogatories that seek “lists” as answers are 
generally the most useful in discovering necessary information.  
As such, the usefulness of these types of interrogatories must be 
retained when crafting any type of rule to increase the 
effectiveness of the discovery process. 
III. PROPOSALS FOR CHANGE 
A. Proposal I: Create Standardized Interrogatories Based on 
 
 32 Berman, supra note 19, at 162 (discussing the possible objections to 
knowledgeable person interrogatories). 
 33 Berman, supra note 19, at 162 (citing Brock v. R.J. Auto Parts & Serv., Inc., 864 
F.2d 677, 679 (10th Cir. 1988)).  The majority rule in the federal courts is that witness 
lists are not discoverable through interrogatories.  HAYDOCK ET AL., supra note 1, at 369-
70; cf. FED. R. CIV. P. 26(a)(3)(A) (requiring pretrial disclosure of a witness list). 
 34 Berman, supra note 19, at 162 (citing Eppler v. Ciba-Geigy Corp., 860 F. Supp. 
1391, 1396 (W.D. Mo. 1994)). 
 35 Berman, supra note 19, at 162 (explaining the benefits of knowledgeable person 
interrogatories); see HAYDOCK ET AL., supra note 1, at 364 (discussing how interrogatories 
can help target people and topics for later discovery). 
 36 HAYDOCK ET AL., supra note 1, at 367 (“Categories of information that 
interrogatories do disclose in an effective and economical way include specific, objective 
types of information.”). 
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Subject Matter 
The first proposal would amend Rule 33 to require answers 
to certain standardized interrogatories.  These non-objectionable 
interrogatories would be categorized according to substantive 
areas of the law, such as antitrust or patent cases.  This proposal 
addresses the gamesmanship of the current interrogatory 
practice by stamping certain questions as non-objectionable. 
This amendment to Rule 33 would sacrifice the current 
breadth of interrogatories in favor of requiring answers to certain 
interrogatories.  The proposal would add several forms to Rule 
33, each designed with a specific practice area in mind.  These 
forms would list a handful of interrogatory questions to which 
objections would be impossible.  A party would face sanctions 
immediately upon failure to answer these questions. 
This proposal suggests that the 1993 amendments to Rule 
33, limiting the number of interrogatories that each party may 
file, changed the strategic use of interrogatories, but did not 
eliminate the game playing.  That is, historically, parties abused 
the device by burying an opponent in interrogatories; but today, 
parties carefully craft the few interrogatories they send and 
spend an equal time crafting objections.37  So while the 1993 
amendments to Rule 33 addressed both overuse and 
stonewalling, overuse is more easily detected and solved than is 
stonewalling.38  Prior to the 1993 amendments, many 
commentators cited interrogatories as the most abused form of 
discovery.39  Because the 1993 amendments did little to address 
abuse, interrogatories remain a serious drain on client resources 
with little return on value.  Eliminating the possibility for 
objection, at least for a few categories of substantive law, would 
eliminate the objection game-playing altogether. 
1. Uniform Interrogatories in the State Courts 
Included in these standardized interrogatories might be 
contention interrogatories, technical or statistical interrogatories, 
and knowledgeable person interrogatories.40  Because these 
 
 37 Schutz & Schwiebert, supra note 10, at 135-37 (reporting how the amendments to 
Rule 33 in 1993 changed the strategic use of interrogatories from a paper-dump problem 
to a wordsmithing problem); see also Oliver, supra note 3, at 659 (describing one problem 
of interrogatories as “overuse” and another as “abuse”). 
 38 HARE ET AL., supra note 4, at 66, 79. 
 39 E.g., Schutz & Schwiebert, supra note 10, at 135 (citing JOHN J. COUND ET AL., 
CIVIL PROCEDURE—CASES AND MATERIALS 743 (5th ed. 1989)). 
 40 See supra Part I. INTRODUCTION (explaining how these three types of questions 
are the most useful and fair interrogatories). 
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interrogatories would be tailored to specific practice areas – the 
interrogatories for an antitrust suit would differ from the 
interrogatories for an employment discrimination suit – the 
adoption of the forms would be highly politicized.  However, 
several states have in fact adopted uniform interrogatories,41 and 
these proposals operate in the states with some success.42  In 
writing the federal forms, the Committee should borrow the 
design of those states that have adopted uniform interrogatories, 
triggered by certain substantive claims. 
For example, Connecticut limits the interrogatories one can 
use in personal injury actions arising from the operation or 
ownership of a motor vehicle, or the ownership, maintenance, or 
control of real property, to those interrogatories set forth in 
specified forms.43  As such, it appears that if a party wishes to 
serve interrogatories, she can only use the interrogatories set 
forth in the forms.  However, if a party does not wish to serve 
certain interrogatories listed on the forms, or does not wish to 
serve any interrogatories, she is not required to do so. 
In contrast, in New Jersey, personal injury claims have 
mandatory uniform interrogatories.44  These interrogatories are 
mandatory in that upon service of the complaint and defendant’s 
answer to the complaint, the uniform interrogatories are deemed 
automatically served; both sides must serve the uniform 
interrogatories.45  Moreover, the responding party must answer 
 
 41 See, e.g., N.J. CT. R. 4:17-1 (explaining the rules pertaining to uniform 
interrogatories in certain actions); CONN. R. CT. § 13-6 (discussing the rules pertaining to 
interrogatories); ARIZ. R. CIV. P. 33.1 (explaining the rules regarding uniform and non-
uniform interrogatories). 
 42 This proposal would benefit greatly from such empirical data as that gathered 
prior to the Advisory Committee on Civil Rules’ changes to Rule 33 in 1993.  See JOHN 
SHAPARD & CARROLL SERON, FED. JUDICIAL CTR., ATTORNEYS’ VIEWS OF LOCAL RULES 
LIMITING INTERROGATORIES (1986) as an example of a study that polled attorneys on how 
state changes to the interrogatory device helped and hurt those attorneys in practice. 
 43 CONN. R. CT. § 13-6(b) (“In all personal injury actions alleging liability based on 
the operation or ownership of a motor vehicle or alleging liability based on the ownership, 
maintenance or control of real property, the interrogatories served shall be limited to 
those set forth in Forms 201, 202 and/or 203 of the rules of practice, unless upon motion, 
the judicial authority determines that such interrogatories are inappropriate or 
inadequate in the particular action.”). 
 44 See N.J. CT. R. 4:17-1(b) (discussing when uniform interrogatories are mandatory). 
 45 The relevant section of N.J. CT. R. 4:17-1(b)(2) reads: “A party defendant served 
with a complaint in an action subject to uniform interrogatories as prescribed by 
subparagraph b(1) of this rule shall be deemed to have been simultaneously served with 
such interrogatories.  The defendant shall serve answers to the appropriate uniform 
interrogatories within 60 days after service by that defendant of the answer to the 
complaint.  The plaintiff in such an action shall be deemed to have been served with 
uniform interrogatories simultaneously with service of defendant’s answer to the 
complaint and shall serve answers to the interrogatories within 30 days after service of 
the answer to the complaint.” 
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the uniform interrogatories within a specified number of days.46 
New Jersey Rule of Court 4:17-1(b), sets out when a party 
must use uniform interrogatories. 
In all actions seeking recovery for property damage to automobiles 
and in all personal injury cases other than wrongful death, toxic torts, 
cases involving issues of professional malpractice other than medical 
malpractice, and those products liability cases either involving 
pharmaceuticals or giving rise to a toxic tort claim, the parties shall 
be limited to the interrogatories prescribed by Forms A, B, and C of 
Appendix II, as appropriate . . . .47 
New Jersey does allow each party to propound ten additional 
questions without leave of court.48  Any additional 
interrogatories, however, shall be permitted only with the court’s 
permission.49 
New Jersey and Connecticut are not alone in their creation 
of uniform interrogatories.  There is “[a]n accelerating trend in 
state civil procedure rules” toward the use of court-created rather 
than lawyer-initiated discovery.50  For example, California 
provides uniform interrogatories merely as a guide, allowing for 
other interrogatories and permitting the responding party its full 
catalog of objections.51 
 
 46 N.J. CT. R. 4:17-1(b)(2); N.J. CT. R. 4:17-1(b)(4) (“Except as otherwise provided in 
subparagraph (b)(3) of this rule, every question propounded by a uniform interrogatory 
must be answered unless the court has otherwise ordered.”).  As such, the only valid 
objections to these uniform interrogatories are claims of privilege and claims that the 
information sought “is the subject of an identified protective order issued pursuant to R. 
4:10-3.”  N.J. CT. R. 4:17-1(b)(3).  Examples of some of the uniform interrogatories 
provided in Appendix II of Rule 4:17-1 are as follows: 
1. State: (a) the full name and residence address of each defendant; (b) if a 
corporation, the exact corporate name; and (c) if a partnership, the exact 
partnership name and the full name and residence address of each partner.  
  
. . .   
3. If you intend to set up or plead or have set up or pleaded negligence or any 
other separate defense as to the plaintiff or if you have or intend to set up a 
counterclaim or third-party action, (a) state the facts upon which you intend to 
predicate such defenses, counterclaim or third-party action; and (b) identify a 
copy of every document relating to such facts. 
N.J. CT. R.4:17-1, app. II. 
 47 N.J. CT. R. 4:17-1(b)(1) (emphasis added). 
 48 Id. 
 49 Id. 
 50 See Seymour Moskowitz, Rediscovering Discovery: State Procedural Rules and the 
Level Playing Field, 54 RUTGERS L. REV. 595, 616-17 (2002) (discussing the 
implementation of uniform interrogatories in certain states). 
 51 See, e.g., Judicial Council of California, Form Interrogatories–Employment Law 
(2002), available at http://www.calbar.ca.gov/calbar/pdfs/sections/laborlaw/2002-form-
interrogatories.pdf. 
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Arizona also has uniform interrogatories, for specific causes 
of action, which serve as a guide.52  “In Arizona, there are twenty-
two standard uniform interrogatories for personal injury actions 
and twenty-three standard uniform interrogatories for contract 
actions.”53  Although in Arizona an attorney does not have to use 
these uniform interrogatories, Arizona’s Special Bar Committee 
to Study Civil Litigation Abuses proposed the creation of uniform 
interrogatories to address the same problems presently facing 
the federal system  — namely discovery abuse that leads to 
inefficiency.54  The Arizona Supreme Court’s Comment in 
accepting Rule 33.1 explained that the creation of uniform 
interrogatories “was part of a comprehensive set of rule revisions 
proposed by the Special Bar Committee to Study Civil Litigation 
Abuse, Cost and Delay, which was specifically charged . . . with 
the task of proposing rules to reduce discovery abuse and to make 
the judicial system in Arizona more efficient, expeditious, and 
accessible to the people.”55  As such, it appears that Arizona 
attempted to address the problem of abuse, rather than overuse, 
of its state’s interrogatories. 
The state models will help the Committee navigate the 
political waters of deciding which interrogatories in each 
substantive area of the law to make non-objectionable, at least as 
far as federal and state claims overlap.56 
The state models will also help the Committee decide if the 
federal uniform interrogatories (1) will be mandatory to ask; (2) 
will be mandatory to answer; and (3) will be exclusive (the only 
interrogatories a party may send).  The answer to the first 
question should be “no,” in order to preserve the traditional 
optional nature of sending interrogatories.  The answer to the 
second question must be “yes,” in order to eliminate the game 
playing in interrogatory battles, and because the questions have 
 
 52 ARIZ. R. CIV. P. 33.1(f) (“The use of Uniform Interrogatories is not mandatory.  The 
interrogatories should serve as a guide only, and may or may not be approved as to either 
form or substance in a particular case.  They are not to be used as a standard set of 
interrogatories for submission in all cases.  Each interrogatory should be used only where 
it fits the particular case.”). 
 53 Moskowitz, supra note 50, at 616. 
 54 ARIZ. R. CIV. P. 33.1 (Court Comment to the 1991 Amendment). 
 55 Id. (emphasis added). 
 56 Other sources from which the Committee might pull non-objectionable 
interrogatories, more keyed to federal claims, are those handbooks that set forth 
“boilerplate” interrogatories.  In fact, lawyers who specialize in certain substantive areas 
of the law already rely on form interrogatories.  See, e.g., DOUGLAS DANNER & LARRY L. 
VARN, PATTERN DISCOVERY: TORT ACTIONS (3d. ed. 2004).  Such sources, though, do not 
have the benefit of having passed through the deliberative process of a state government 
and may favor one party unduly over another. 
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already been screened so as to be non-objectionable. 
Answering the third question is more challenging.  
Amendments to Rule 33 should not permit the parties to set forth 
any additional interrogatories beyond the uniform 
interrogatories provided for in the amended Rule 33, without 
leave of court.  If Rule 33 allowed for such additional 
interrogatories, the room for abuse by attorneys that currently 
exists would remain.  As such, Rule 33 should provide for 
additional interrogatories only with leave of the court. 
2. Possible Objections to the Proposal 
The above discussion points to one specific problem with this 
proposed model: from what sources should the Committee draw 
non-objectionable interrogatories for each form?  Two more 
objections to uniform interrogatories at the federal level present 
themselves.  First, compound fields, such as environmental law, 
may not be amenable to uniform interrogatories that are 
mandatory to answer.  Second, these forms breach the trans-
substantivity to which the Rules aspire. 
First, federal practice does not reduce itself to discrete areas 
of the law.  For example, in an environmental justice suit, claims 
may include Equal Protection Clause violations, Fair Housing 
Act violations, and private and public nuisance claims.57  At first 
glance, perhaps Rule 33 uniform interrogatories should not be 
created for these compound fields.  However, in such a compound 
claim, perhaps a litigant could trigger multiple forms depending 
on the nature of the complaint.  There is a more important 
question, though, for the Committee to answer: what would 
happen if a litigant triggered none of the forms?  Would that 
litigant be denied the interrogatory device, or would the forms 
only modify Rule 33 when that substantive area of the law is part 
of the complaint? 
A preliminary answer denies any interrogatories in this case, 
without leave of court.  If the Committee has yet to approve 
forms that capture the complaint, the parties will waste their 
time, as under the current system, designing and evading crafted 
interrogatories.  The Rule should deny the device in this 
instance. 
 
 57 See generally S. Camden Citizens in Action v. N.J. Dep’t of Envtl. Prot., 254 F. 
Supp. 2d 486, 489 (D.N.J. 2003) (plaintiffs alleged that the New Jersey Department of 
Environmental Protection (NJDEP) violated the Fair Housing Act and the Equal 
Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment, and that the NJDEP created both 
public and private nuisances to the citizens of Camden by issuing a permit to an 
industrial facility in Camden). 
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Next, what interrogatories are available when the case 
presents a complaint combining a claim that will trigger a form 
with one that will not?  One sensible answer would be to deny the 
litigant the free choice of which interrogatories to send.  This is 
because a complaint containing one claim that would trigger a 
form and one that would not fit under a form might otherwise 
allow a litigant to sneak in interrogatories related to the form-
controlled claim by adding interrogatories related to the other 
claim. 
The second objection to this proposal is the lack of trans-
substantivity created by dividing the forms based on the 
substantive law raised in the complaint.  At this time, it appears 
the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure make few, if any, 
distinctions based upon the area of law raised in the complaint.58  
Many Federal Rules “make no policy choice[], . . .thereby 
insulating the Rules from effective challenges under the statute 
delegating rulemaking power to the Supreme Court . . . .”59  
However, the Federal Rules “confer discretion on the trial 
judge[s],” in actuality making Federal Rules “trans-substantive 
only in the most trivial sense.”60 
Some scholars contend that if rulemakers consider Rules 
aimed at specific kinds of litigation, “the resulting rules would 
favor the interests of those groups that were best able to 
influence the rulemaking process.”61  However, other 
commentators note that “maintaining a facial appearance of 
trans-substantivity does not remove politics from the rulemaking 
process.”62  Rather, considering substance-specific Rules allows 
for closer consideration of the possible effects of the proposed 
Rule on interested groups.63  As such, substance-specific 
interrogatories are not inherently problematic.64 
 
 58 See Catherine T. Struve, Doctors, the Adversary System, and Procedural Reform in 
Medical Liability Litigation, 72 FORDHAM L. REV. 943, 1011 (2004) (discussing the trans-
substantivity of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure). 
 59 Id. 
 60 Id. 
 61 Id. 
 62 Id. at 1012; see Stephen B. Burbank, The Costs of Complexity, 85 MICH. L. REV. 
1463, 1473 (1987) (book review) (surveying books discussing the law of complex litigation). 
 63 Struve, supra note 58, at 1012; see Burbank, The Costs of Complexity, supra note 
62, at 1473 (discussing the impact of procedural and substantive rules); see also Stephen 
P. Burbank, Of Rules and Discretion: The Supreme Court, Federal Rules and Common 
Law, 63 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 693, 716-18 (1988) (promoting the creation and use of 
separate sets of procedural rules for different bodies of complex substantive law). 
 64 See Struve, supra note 58, at 1012.  However, it is important to note that 
substance-specific rulemaking is complicated by the fact that under the Rules Enabling 
Act, the Federal Rules must not “abridge, enlarge or modify any substantive right.”  28 
U.S.C. § 2072(b) (2003). 
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Amending Rule 33 in this way would not solve all of the 
problems associated with pretrial written exchanges between 
parties, but this proposed amendment, which narrows the scope 
of Rule 33 by requiring answers to approved questions based on 
the substantive area of the law at issue, might add utility to the 
device. 
B. Proposal II: Eliminate Rule 33 Interrogatories 
Perhaps the problems that interrogatories cause outweigh 
the benefits.  The adoption of required disclosures in Rule 26 
ensures that information is actually exchanged between parties; 
this is precisely what interrogatories were originally designed to 
achieve.  Modifying the mandatory disclosure rule, and 
encouraging the use of requests for admission, might replace the 
bulk of the function of interrogatories.  Considering the benefits 
of interrogatories after taking into account other discovery 
devices might tip the balance in favor of eliminating Rule 33 
altogether. 
Thus, any reform to the interrogatory device benefits from 
viewing the device as useful only after the exhaustion of requests 
for admissions, of initial disclosures, and of pretrial and 
discovery conferencing.65  If what remains is too slight to justify 
the expense of the device, or if amendments to the other devices 
can reduce to nil what value remains in interrogatories, then the 
device should be abolished. 
 1. Initial Disclosures 
Much of the benefit that Rule 33 interrogatories traditionally 
brought to litigation is now provided through other means.  
Adding a certain provision to Rule 26(a) could preserve those 
functions unique to Rule 33.  If the Committee made these 
changes, Rule 33 could be eliminated. 
Mandatory initial disclosures were “designed to accelerate 
the exchange of basic information about the case and to eliminate 
the paper work involved in requesting such information.”66  Rule 
26 requires that each party within fourteen days after the Rule 
26(f) conference disclose the identity of any person likely to have 
 
 65 See HAYDOCK ET AL., supra note 1, at 364 (suggesting that attorneys only use 
interrogatories “when no other discovery request is available to produce the needed 
information”); Schutz & Schwiebert, supra note 10, at 137 (advising that attorneys not 
“waste” their interrogatories searching for information that can be obtained through other 
means). 
 66 Angela R. Lang, Note, Mandatory Disclosure Can Improve the Discovery System, 
70 IND. L.J. 657, 657-58 (1995) (quoting FED. R. CIV. P. 26(a) Advisory Comm. Note). 
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“discoverable information” about the case, disclose a copy or 
description of relevant documents, disclose computations related 
to any category of damages claimed, and disclose any insurance 
agreement likely to be involved in the case.67 
Despite debate regarding the effectiveness of mandatory 
initial disclosures, an empirical study conducted by the Federal 
Judicial Center found that “[i]nitial disclosure is being widely 
used and is apparently working as intended, increasing fairness 
and reducing costs and delays far more often than decreasing 
fairness or increasing costs and delays.”68  As such, in contrast to 
interrogatories, mandatory initial disclosures increase the 
efficiency of litigation. 
Initial disclosures answer basic questions of fact, and this 
instrument eliminates much of the work for which parties had 
historically drafted interrogatories.69  “[T]he ‘court-ordered’ 
interrogatories of Rule 26(a)(1) address one of the historical 
functions of Rule 33 interrogatories — to explore broadly the 
source of evidence available to the opposing party by obtaining 
the identity of witnesses and the existence of documents.”70 
Rule 26(a) may need to be altered to bear the brunt of the 
elimination of interrogatories.  This must be done carefully, 
however, to avoid losing the benefits of interrogatories.  In order 
to abandon interrogatories altogether, the Committee should 
amend Rule 26(a)(1) specifically to allow for the standard 
exchange of certain lists between parties. 
The elimination of Rule 33 interrogatories would, for 
 
 67 FED. R. CIV. P. 26(a)(1) (requiring these disclosures unless a party objects during 
the Rule 26(f) conference that initial disclosures are not appropriate in the circumstances 
of the action and states the objection in the Rule 26(f) discovery plan).  The Advisory 
Committee Note to the 1993 Amendment further provides that: “Unless the court directs 
a different time, the disclosures required by subdivision (a)(1) are to be made at or within 
10 days after the meeting of the parties under subdivision (f). . . . As provided in the last 
sentence of subdivision (a)(1), a party is not excused from the duty of disclosure merely 
because its investigation is incomplete. The party should make its initial disclosures 
based on the pleadings and the information then reasonably available to it.”  FED. R. CIV. 
P. 26(a) Advisory Comm. Note. 
 68 WILLGING ET AL., supra note 2, at 2.  The result of this study, in part, encouraged 
the Committee to amend Rule 26 to eliminate the opt-out provision.  See also Kuo-Chang 
Huang, Mandatory Disclosure: A Controversial Device with No Effects, 21 PACE L. REV. 
203, 237-39 (2000) (explaining major findings of the study). 
 69 HAYDOCK ET AL, supra note 1, at 363 (explaining how mandatory disclosures have 
eliminated much of what interrogatories used to accomplish); see also Oliver, supra note 
3, at 660 (describing how Kentucky’s use of initial disclosures “is intended to eliminate 
the need for lengthy interrogatories”). 
 70 Schutz & Schwiebert, supra note 10, at 136.  Schutz and Schwiebert later explain 
that while initial disclosures “do not eliminate the need for interrogatories directed 
toward these issues,” Rule 26(a) does “allow for fewer and more focused interrogatories 
about these broad categories.”  Id. 
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example, disallow a party from obtaining information regarding 
all knowledgeable persons.  As noted above, Rule 26(a)(1)(A) 
requires a party automatically to disclose the identity of persons 
likely to have information relevant to disputed facts alleged with 
particularity in the pleadings.  However, “whether a disputed 
fact is ‘alleged with particularity’ is not always clear.  Should [an] 
adversary conclude that [a] complaint alleges facts generally, 
rather than with particularity,” she will not provide the names of 
all important witnesses.71  Therefore, unlike Rule 33 
interrogatories, Rule 26(a)(1)(A) does not ensure that an 
adversary will be able to find out the names of all knowledgeable 
persons.  If Rule 33 interrogatories are eliminated, then the 
Committee should alter Rule 26(a)(1)(A) to require the discovery 
of any person who has knowledge of any particular discoverable 
matter, regardless of whether the disputed fact is alleged with 
particularity. 
Also, the Committee should amend Rule 26(a) to require a 
party to release a summary of technical or statistical data, if that 
data is of central concern to the litigation, a disclosure for which 
at present the Rule does not provide.  This technical or statistical 
data, set forth in list form, is essential because document 
requests, such as those required by Rule 26(b)(1), cannot readily 
reveal the needed information.72  The Rule as it stands is 
inadequate for this proposition.  Rule 26(a)(1)(B) requires the 
disclosure of “a copy of, or a description by category and location 
of, all documents, data compilations, and tangible things that are 
in the possession, custody, or control of the party and that the 
disclosing party may use to support its claims or defenses, unless 
solely for impeachment.”73  The disclosure of documents, 
although requiring the disclosure of data compilations, 
significantly differs from the disclosure of technical and 
statistical data.74    
Lastly, the Committee should alter Rule 26(a) to preserve 
the utility of contention interrogatories.  Contention 
 
 71 Berman, supra note 19, at 162-63. 
 72 See supra text accompanying notes 28-30. 
 73 FED. R. CIV. P. 26(a)(1)(B). 
 74 Technical and statistical data describes, for example, how many different types of 
bottles a manufacturer produces and in what quantities consumers purchase these types 
of bottles, rather than just showing invoices.  See FED. R. CIV. P. 33(d) (allowing a 
responding party to direct the propounding party to the primary business records, when 
both parties could expend equal effort in crafting a list from the source documents).  In 
this view, then, Rule 33(d) does not differ greatly from Rule 26(a) as both now stand, and 
therefore the Committee might not have to amend Rule 26(a) in this respect were it to 
eliminate Rule 33. 
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interrogatories protect parties by eliminating: 
the potential prejudice or surprise to the party responding to the fraud 
claim [for example] that might arise from the insertion at some point 
in the litigation of unexpected and unpleaded allegations of 
misrepresentations, and also saves the courts and litigants time spent 
on litigating the adequacy of the . . . pleading of fraud and the . . . 
attempt to replead the claim with the requisite particularity.75 
At this time, however, it is unclear how to obtain the 
invaluable information from contention interrogatories through 
Rule 26(a) were Rule 33 eliminated.  Conceived in theory, losing 
the contention interrogatory is a major loss to a party who wants 
to learn the meat behind their opponents’ pleadings.  It should be 
kept in mind, though, that the evasive interrogatory exchange as 
it now exists rarely exchanges this information anyway; losing 
the current system of contention interrogatories is not really 
losing much. 
 2. Other Discovery Devices 
Rule 26 is not the only rule that overlaps with much of what 
is useful about today’s Rule 33.76  Increasing the use of requests 
for admissions might do much of the work that interrogatories 
could theoretically do, and make up for the resulting elimination 
of Rule 33’s current breadth.  Pretrial conferences provide for an 
additional exchange of meaningful information, albeit at a time 
further along in the case than when interrogatories would 
normally be sent. 
Requests for admissions are similar to interrogatories in that 
both allow one party to discover more about how the adversary 
plans to act at trial and how the adversary views its own case.  
While the two methods seek the information in different ways — 
asking for a list of previously unknown parties versus a 
confirmation of suspected parties — the request for admission 
mimics the best of what interrogatories have to offer a litigant 
during early pretrial.77  Also, both interrogatories and admissions 
 
 75 David Hricik, Wrong About Everything: The Application by the District Courts of 
Rule 9(b) to Inequitable Conduct, 86 MARQ. L. REV. 895, 921 n.100 (2003) (quoting 
Schaller Tel. Co. v. Golden Sky Sys., Inc., 139 F. Supp. 2d 1071, 1099-1100 (N.D. Iowa 
2001)). 
 76 See HAYDOCK ET AL., supra note 1, at 364 (reporting that many practitioners 
prefer to use document production requests and depositions instead of interrogatories to 
obtain the same information). 
 77 Edna Selan Epstein, Rule 36: In Praise of Requests to Admit, in THE LITIGATION 
MANUAL PRETRIAL 150-53 (John G. Koeltl & John Kiernan eds., 3d ed., 1999) (“[A]nswers 
to interrogatories are rarely as useful as the responses that must be made to well-framed 
requests to admit.”).  But see Cecilia H. Gonzalez, Requests for Admissions, in PATENT 
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may be served on parties only. 
However, there is no limit in Rule 36 comparable to that in 
Rule 33 as to how many requests for admission a party may file, 
so an increased reliance on requests for admission might 
resurrect some of the problems that the cap on the number of 
interrogatories solved.  Unlike interrogatories, though, courts in 
complex litigation do not view successive sets of requests for 
admission as burdensome or oppressive; admissions practice 
presents different problems than does interrogatories practice.78  
We also note that, “answers to interrogatories . . . are not 
admissions, and a party can supplement or amend its answers” 
to interrogatories, so parties answering admissions are more 
careful to avoid traps.79 
Pretrial conferences under Rule 16 and discovery conferences 
under Rule 26(f) might also carry much of the weight that the 
drafters of Rule 33 intended that Rule to cover.  Both meetings 
contemplate another set of disclosures, at different distances 
from trial.  Rule 26(f)’s encouragement of settlement discussions 
might help replace what benefit contention interrogatories 
brought to the parties under Rule 33.  As for timing, parties most 
often use interrogatories well in advance of trial, before the 
deposition phase, and reserve the ability to propound more 
interrogatories after objections or inadequate responses.80  This 
proposed revision to the Federal Rules — eliminating Rule 33 
interrogatories and adding certain provisions to Rule 26(a) — 
would not therefore disrupt the timing of discovery exchange.  
That is, requests for admissions may be made at any time, like 
interrogatories; Rule 26(f) contemplates a conference early on in 
discovery, and Rule 16 contemplates a conference very near to 
trial.  Because interrogatories are most often used early in 
litigation, and then supplemented as needed later, these 
alternate devices cover the span of time in which interrogatories 
are useful.  The robustness of the exchange of information at 
Rule 16 and Rule 26(f) conferences, though, is a question for 
 
LITIGATION STRATEGIES HANDBOOK 183, 188 (Barry L. Grossman & Gary M. Hoffman 
eds., 2000) (“[T]he request for admission is not the proper tool for discovering general 
information about the position of the opposing party” but rather “is a basic tool that 
allows the parties to narrow the issues of the case.”). 
 78 For a comparison of interrogatories and requests to admit related to this point, see 
Epstein, supra note 77, at 150-51 (“The rules recognize the value of requests to admit by 
not limiting their number.”). 
 79 See Schutz & Schwiebert, supra note 10, at 146 (explaining parties’ use of 
interrogatories and admissions as a tactical measure). 
 80 See HAYDOCK ET AL., supra note 1, at 366 (advising parties “that interrogatories 
are best used in the early stages of discovery” and explaining the timing of the various 
discovery devices). 
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further study. 
 3. Possible Objections to the Proposal 
The expanded use of Rule 26 requests for admission and of 
pretrial and discovery conferences might not replace all of the 
work that interrogatories do or should do.  Requests for 
admission, for example, require phrasing similar to that of a 
cross-examination at trial;81 a request for admission requires that 
the proponent “have some knowledge of the genuineness of the 
matter requested.”82  Interrogatories, on the other hand, allow for 
narrative answers, and do not require the sender to have certain 
knowledge of the opponent.83 
The requests for admission device does not perfectly replace 
the interrogatory, at least not as the interrogatory is conceived in 
theory.  However, the request for admission device in practice 
today serves the function the drafters intended interrogatories to 
serve.  Requests for admission are a less burdensome discovery 
device and courts have had fewer problems with them than with 
the interrogatory exchange.  Because requests for admission do 
most, though not all of what interrogatories were intended to 
accomplish, and because interrogatories actually accomplish very 
little, there is little risk in eliminating interrogatories.  Consider 
also the great expense that interrogatories mean for parties as 
compared to their utility.  The expanded use of pretrial 
conferences, considered here particularly for the conferences’ 
ability to narrow issues for trial, overlaps with much of what 
interrogatories might have done, as conceived in Rule 33.  
Finally, because interrogatories in practice exchange very little 
substantive information, interrogatories are failing to live up to 
their expectation and theoretical utility.  If the device does not 
work, if it costs a great deal, and if other discovery devices better 
accomplish what interrogatories were intended to accomplish, 
then there is little reason to maintain the device. 
 
 81 See Gonzalez, supra note 77, at 192 n.57 (“[M]any do not [even] view the request 
for admission as a discovery tool . . . .” ). 
 82 Gonzalez, supra note 77, at 194 (adding that “the responding party is not 
compelled to respond to ambiguous requests”). 
 83 See HAYDOCK ET AL., supra note 1, at 369 (“The interrogatory, ‘State all facts upon 
which you base your claim of failure to warn in Paragraph 3 of the Complaint,’ is 
preferable to the request for admission, ‘You know of no facts upon which you base your 
claim for failure to warn.’”) (quoting CAL. CONTINUING EDUC. OF THE BAR, CALIFORNIA 
CIVIL DISCOVERY PRACTICE 333 (1975)).  Haydock and his co-authors assume, however, 
that these hypothetical interrogatories will produce a responsive answer. 
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IV. CONCLUSION 
Any proposal for change to Rule 33 needs to be sensitive to 
what, if anything, interrogatories can accomplish under the 
current Rules, taking into account the contribution of initial 
disclosures.  While both of the above proposals would eliminate 
the objections that automatically fly when parties exchange 
interrogatories, neither can entirely replace interrogatories 
because neither allows specific and searching questions as to the 
other parties’ contentions.  The Committee should consider 
whether keeping the opportunity for parties to exchange 
questions regarding contentions is worth the inefficiency and 
expense of the interrogatory device, particularly when even 
contention interrogatories rarely work as the sender intends 
them to work.  After all, as the discussion of the second proposal 
above shows, existing discovery devices, including requests for 
admissions, initial disclosures, and discovery and pretrial 
conferences, can accomplish much of the positive work of 
interrogatories, such as narrowing the issues that are to be tried.  
In contrast, the first proposal shows great promise if the 
Committee could draft uniform questions for certain areas of the 
law.  The proposal should also focus on contentions.  The Rules 
should combine both proposals, keeping the interrogatory device 
only as far as it allows non-objectionable contention 
interrogatories in certain areas of the law, and expanding initial 
disclosures to address whom within the client’s reach is a person 
most knowledgeable. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
